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Informal Social Networking and
Community Involvement :
Participation in Neighborhood
Crime Watches in Japan
Sean Richey
University of Tokyo
The inclusion of social recreational
activities
in measures of social capital is often criticized for trivializing
civic engagement.
This critique, however , ignores a key
aspect of social capital theory, the interconnectedness
of
civil society. I examine the influence of informal social
recreation
on formal community
involvement.
I test the
impact of social recreation on the likelihood of joining a
Japanese
neighborhood
crime watch, while controlling
for other determinants
of participation.
I use a logistic
regression
model of 2000 International
Crime Victim
Survey data . The results verify that social recreation motivates people to join crime watches, suggesting
that informal
social
interaction
leads
to broader
civic
engagement.

D

oes social recreation lead to more formal community involvement? Critics complain that Putnam's (1993, 2000)
inclusion of recreational activities in studies of social
capital trivializes civil society. For example, Gannett (2003, 2)
posits that using social events such as backyard barbecues as
evidence of civic engagement blurs our understanding of participation in more important "political" community involvement.
Putnam (2000, 119) suggests that social networks motivate community involvement by facilitating discussion, engendering trust,
and instigating norms that lead to participation. For example, a
backyard barbecue may enable a discussion of problems in the
local schoo l system that leads to involvement in more "political"
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volunteer associations such as the PTA. Critics view thi theory
as conceptua lly ambiguous due to a perceived confusion of the
social with the political, and dismiss the influence of informal
socializing on formal community involvement (see Edwards
2004). Empirical evidence is needed to resolve the debate.
To examine the relationship between civic involvement and
social interaction, I test the impact of informal socializing on
individuals joining neighborhood crime watches, while controlling for fear of crime, prior crime victimhood, police competence, and socioeconomic detem1inants of participation. Crime
watches are chosen as the dependent variable because joining
with neighbors to prevent crime is a clear example of formal
communal involvement that these critics say is a better measure
of civil society. I test the theory by using a logistic regression
model of International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) data from
Japan. I choose Japan because neighborhood solutions to crime
are common and used throughout the country (Thornton 1992).
Japan is an excellent place to test the relationship between socia l
and civic interaction because crime watches are available for all
survey respondents to join. The United States, for example, is a
less optimal country to test because crime watch usage is limited
and regional (Thornton 1992). Limited usage biases the results
from the ICVS national sample since joining is not an option for
some respondents. I find that social recreation motivates people
to join neighborhood watches, suggesting that Putnam is correct
in asserting that informal social interaction leads to broader civic
engagement.
Although many recent studies show the benefits of civic engagement on communities and participating individuals, the social mechanisms that cause collective action have not received
the attention they deserve (Ostrom 1998). Before we can promote civil society, we first must know what causes people to participate. Social capital scholars study activities that facilitate or
TIIEJOURN
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hinder one's opportunities to join. For example, Putnam (2000,
235) shows that television viewing limits joining voluntary associations or even family picnics. He posits that America's recent
civic disengagement is caused by the dominance of television,
which lowered civic association membership. Involvement in
choral societies, soccer clubs, and bowling leagues are not endgoals. Instead, social capital theorists desire the communal benefits created by membership in these associations. Putnam (2000)
shows that aggregate participation is higher in regions with
dense social networks. He suggests that interaction in face-toface activities sponsors other community involvement.
Critics complain that there is no relevance to democracy from
studying involvement in trifling informal recreational activities
(Edwards 2004). Edwards (2004) doubts that informal socializing influences participation in formal community activities.
However, the face-to-face interaction that Edwards finds beneficial in formal associations also occurs in informal human relations. Using Edward's logic, backyard barbecues should increase
civic engagement as well. Gannett shows that Putnam's chief
influence, Tocqueville, differentiated between formal civil and
political associations-which
are crucial for democracy-and
social recreation. Tocqueville thought that recreation may "allow
residents to 'taste the enjoyments of private life"' (Gannett 2003,
2), but is not important for politics. Gannett states "we simply
cannot equate family picnics with various types of political engagement if we are to make our democracy work" (Gannett
2003, 2). These critics, however, do not test empirically a key
concept of Putnam's theory, that social recreation increases participation in formal civil society. If you want to increase community involvement, and social recreation increases involvement,
then informal networks are "political" and must be studied.
Other correlates of participation must be controlled to determine the relationship between social and civic orientation. For
VOL. 33 2005
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example , people may join because they derive direct benefits
from group membership (Olson 1990), i.e. instrumental reasons.
They may also have a belief or emotional attachment to an is ue
that does not profit them directly, but still motivates them to join,
i.e. personal reasons. Although these reasons are not mutually
exclusive, measuring which is the most powerful motivating
force can help focus programs that facilitate civil society.
THE POLICY AND THEORETICAL

IMPLICATIONS

The results of my research have important policy and theoretical implications . For policymakers, the research is important
because many reformers suggest the need for programs to encourage civil society. Detem1ining the causes of participation
will provide reformers empirical evidence to improve their programs. If human interaction mobilizes participation, then these
programs should focus on deepening their participants ' social
networks . If, however, people join because of incentives or personal reasons, then these programs can attenuate these aspects.
At this time, experiments to promote Japanese civil society are
being conducted with incentive programs such as community
currencies, and programs that focus on the specific interests of
townspeople. In studying neighborhood watch involvement, my
research provides a model to enhance programs .
Theorists frequently debate the importance of institutions to
civil society (e.g. Edwards and Foley 2001, and Edwards 2004).
The research presented here provides a test of the debate. Jackman and Mi11er (1998) describe an internal inconsistency within
scholarship as to whether civic engagement is endogenous or
exogenous of institutions. They prefer James Coleman's (1990)
endogenous research approach. Putnam 's work has grown from
an early (1993, 18) thesis that posited an exogenous-only 'bottom-up" relationship from civic culture to institutions, to a later
stance (2000, 413) in which institutions can promote civil sociTI IE JO UR J\L OF PO LITI C1\L SC IENCE
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ety. My research tests these assumptions . If informal social networks promote joining watches, then civic engagement is created
by recreational activity, and institutional participation is not the
only determinant of civil society.
I find that informal social networks in Japan promote volunteering for crime watches, showing that civic engagement can be
developed exogenously of institutions. Jackman and Miller 's
( 1998) endogenous-only approach misses the important interconnectedness of communal life. Of course, participation in institutions may also increase one's civic engagement. Thus,
influences of participation in civil society are possibly both endogenous and exogenous of institutions. The research proceeds
as follows : after reviewing the hypotheses and data, I determine
the influence of everyday casual interaction--defined as "informal social networks " -on civic organizational involvementdefined as "formal social networks."
JAPANESE NEIG HBOR HOOD WATCH PARTlCIPAT ION AN D
CRIME PREVENT ION

Japan has low levels of social disorganization (Roberts and
Lafree 2004). Social disorganization and social capital are similar concepts, in that both maintain that deep social networks
bring collective good. A large body of literature suggests that the
high level of social capital--or low level of social disorganization- is responsible for Japan's low crime rates (Clifford 1976,
Vogel 1979, Braithwaite 1989, Bayley 1991, Westermann and
Burfeind 1991, Komiya 1999, Roberts and Lafree 2004). Japan
is thought to have a communal culture, and these societal ties are
linked to crime prevention (Becker 1988, Fujimoto 1994,
MacFarlane 1995, Komiya 1999, Roberts and Lafree 2004).
Shame and a desire not to hurt one's group are suggested as limiting levels of deviant behavior (Thornton 1992, Roberts and
Lafree 2004) . Others scholars disagree with these cultural explaVO L.
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nations of Japan's lower relative crime rates. For example, Roberts and Lafree (2004) use time series analysis of aggregate data
to sh9w that Japan's high employment and relatively low leve ls
of young males in the population (who commit most crime) account for its lower comparative crime rates . These socio-cu ltura l
theories of Japan's low crime rates, however, do not explain why
only some people join neighborhood watches, even after contro lling for fear of crime, urbanity, prior victimization, police mcompetence,
and other soc10econom1c determinants
of
participation.
DATA

To test these assumptions, I use ICVS data, which is sponsored by the United Nations Inten·egional Crime and Justice Research Institute. In Japan, Koichi Hamai of the Ministry of
Justice coordinates the survey nationally. The ICVS is performe d
every four years, and I test data from the latest version conducte d
in 2000. The survey has a sample of 2,500 and a response rate of
88%. Neighborhood is a dichotomous dependent variable meas uring whether someone joined a crime watch coded "I" if participating and "0" if not. The key causal independent variable is
from a question that asks "[h]ow often do you personally go out
in the evening for recreational purposes?" Social involvement is
coded from no social recreational activity ("0"), once a year
("I"), once a month ("2"), once a week ("3 "), and almost every
day activity ("4"). Past crime victimization is measured as Victim
and Violent, both are coded "I" if a victim in the last five years,
and "0" if not. 1 Fear may motivate someone to join a crime prevention program (Lewis and Salem 1986), and it is coded from
1

Victim is combined from various !CVS questions on different types of crime victimization, including assault, robbery, rape, attempted murder , and corruption . See Table I
for !CVS variable numbers .
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no fear ("I"), little fear ("2"), some fear ("3"), and much fear
("4"). Neighborhood watch participation might also come from a
lack of adequate policing. How someone feels about Police competence is coded from very good ("I"), somewhat good ("2"),
somewhat poor ("3"), to very poor ("4").
Socioeconomic factors affect the opportunities to join , and
unless controlled can bias the results. Along with political
knowledge, education may cause a person to become rhetorically
skillful and willing to participate (Freitag 2003). Education is
measured in years of schooling. The elderly volunteer more often, and have longer ties to their community (Freitag 2003), so I
control for Age measured in ascending five-year categories starting from eighteen. Having a job may limit the time to participate ,
so I include Employment, coded dichotomously with " 1" being
jobholders and "0" for the unemployed. Women are more communally active (LeBlanc 1999); here Female equals "1" and
male is coded "0." Rural areas have a more reciprocal communal
life than urban areas (Putnam 2000, 96), so I include Urban,
coded ordinally based on town size; ranging from "1" for towns
with a population under 10,000 to "6" those with populations
over 2,000,000 . Singles may have fewer time constraints, and
thus participation may be easier for them than for married couples (Freitag 2003); Married is a dichotomous variable with " I"
being those married, and "0" those single. Importantly, no control variables are post-treatment, i.e. caused by watch participation.

VOL. 33 2005
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The data include 1,350 complete cases, out of 2,211. Error
occurs when missing data are not missing completely at random
(King et al. 2001 ). Table 1 lists the number of responses for each
variable. Many of the cases are missing only one variable's response, but regression analysis using listwise deletion throws out
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE ST ATlSTICS
Variable
Mean
S.D.
Min
eighborhood Watch
0.14
0.349
0
Social
1.40
1.116
0
Fear
2.13
0.639
1
Victim
0.41
0.492
0
Violent
0.03
0.173
0
Police
2.35
0.702
I
Urban
3.37
1.500
1
Age
7.46
3.222
1
Education
12.05
2.715
7
Employment
0.62
0.483
0
Female
0.51
0.500
0

Max
1
4
4
1
1
4
6
12
18
1
I

N
2189
2211
2210
2211
2211
1844
1687
2211
2079
2211
2211

These are the average descriptive statistics of the multiple imputed data sets. To replicate, use 2000 Japan !CVS variables numbers Social S0060, Fear S0020, Victim
C0IA00, 02A000, C03A000, CO4A000, C0SA000, C06A000, C07A000, C0Si\000.
C09A000, CI0A000, Cl IA000, Cl2A000, C13A0OO, Cl4Al00, Cl IA000,
C 12A000; Violent C 11A000, CI 2A000; Police P00 IOI, Urban D0020, Married
D0090, Age D0010, Educ. D0063, Employ. D0050, Gell{/erK040. "N"· is the number
of cases before multiple imputation.

the entire case. Multiple imputation is a better alternative than
listwise deletion (King et al. 2001). Multiple imputation creates
data for the missing responses based on information in the case
and the other data. Simulated data are more trustworthy than data
biased by listwise deletion (King et al. 2001 ). I use the Amelia
(King et al. 2001) program to create five imputed data sets, and
each with 2211 cases. I use the Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg, and
King 2003) package from Stata to handle the multiple data sets,
run the regressions, calculate the standard errors, and create the
TIJE JOURNAL
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simulations below. To determine if the imputation is biasing the
results, I show the outcomes from two models (see Table 2). One
model uses the original complete case data, and one uses the
multiple imputation data sets.
METHODS

To determine the impact of social networks on a dependent
variable, many researchers perform a multiple regress ion anal ysis of survey data with social networks as the causal variable.
while controlling for other determinants, such as soc10economics. I take the same approach with this research.
Neighborhood is a dichotomous dependent variable, so I create a
logistic model, which is appropriate for binary outcomes (Long
1997). The model is estimated as

YNl•1ghhorhood=a+/J1 *X Sot'ial +/31 *X Fear +/J3 *X J'irtim +/J4 *X f'ohcc
+ /Js * X
+ /J10* X

UrlHm

+/J o* x \/urric,I
+ /31* XA

Gcmlcr

gc

+/JR* X

E,,,,, +

/Jq* x,,,,,,,,..,

+£

Also, I present below the results from Clarifj• (Tomz , Wittenberg, and King 2003), which creates simulations drawn from the
data to show a quantity of interest. Clarify :Sautho rs King, Ton12,
and Wittenberg (2000) describe its process thusly: "[t]he program draws simulations of the main and anci llary parameters
from their asymptotic sampling distribution, in most cases a multivariate nom1al with mean equal to the vector of parameter estimates and variance equal to the variance-covariance matrix of
estimates." Here, all the other control variables are held at their
mean, and the expected probability of participating in a watch 1s
shown for each level of socializing .
Violent crime victims may have different leve ls of per onal
satisfaction from stoppmg crime than less serious crime victims,
and both are included in the Victim variable. To detem1me i r
\ '() ]._ 33 2005
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there is a difference, I create a separate Violent variable to measure only those who have suffered violent crime. I create a Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) plot of the two modelsall crime victims and just violent crime victims-to compare
these specifications (see King and Zeng 2002 for more on ROC
plots).
In addition, I check against endogeneity between the dependent and causal variables because through joining a crime watch
people may meet friends that they socialize with afterwards.
Thus, the level of informal socialization may come from civic
engagement. I examine the potential bi-casual relationship using
an Amemiya Generalized Least Squares (AGLS) model. If the
dependent variable is continuous, I can use the familiar twostage least squares estimator to determine the impact of endogeneity. Here, I use "ivprob" command for Stata to control for endogeneity in a model with a dichotomous dependent variab!e.2
RESULTS

Goodness of Fit

The ROC plot displayed in Figure l shows that there is no
significant difference between modeling all and violent crime
victims on participation in neighborhood watches. Simply put,
the results show that violent crime victimization does not influence joining rates anymore than other types of crime. In addition,
the test shows that the model is successfully predicting a high
percentage of the binary outcomes, as the lines are significantly
above the forty-five degree line ofrandom chance.

2

For details of AGLS estimation see Maddalla (I 983, 247-252), and Newey (I 987, eq.
5.6).
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Lines represent how well the logistic model does in
predicting neighborhood watch participation . The
closer the lines are to the upper right comer, the
bett er the model (King and Zeng 2002). The model
with violent crime victims is in dashes , the model
with all crime victims in solid.

LOGISTIC MODEL RESULTS

The results displayed in Table 2 show that a chief rea son people join crime watches is social networking. The data suggests
that the more informal social interaction you have , the more
likely you are to participate in your community. Social recreation
VOi..
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TABLE 2
LOGISTICMODEL RESULTS FOR
PARTICIPATIONIN NEIGHBORHOODWATCHES
cc
Variable
ME
MISE
CCSE

Social
Fear
Victim
Police
Urban
Married
Age
Education
Employment
Female
Constant
Number of cases
Pseudo R2

xi

.154t
.161
.154
-.094
-.224t
-.188
.095t
.038
.053
.397t
-3.160
2,211
0.03
55.60!

.062
.103
.130
.094
.044
.146
.025
.027
.141
.135
.609

.220-r
.068
.169
-.044
-.212t
-.290
.077t
.014
-.019
.433t
-2.54Jt
1,350
0.03
36.7l t

.076
.125
.157
.118
.054
.182
.033
.032
.189
.167
.795

MI rows represe nt the average unsta ndardized coefficients and standard errors of a
logis tic model for the likeli hood of joi ning a crime watc h from each imputed data set
calcu lated wi th Clarify. CC rows represent the unstandard ized coefficients and sta ndard errors of a logistic mode l for the like lihood of joi ning a crime watch from the
orig inal co mplete case data set. t p < .0 I p < .00 I.

t

activity levels have a strong positive significant impact (.154) on
neighborhood watch participation, when holding all other variables constant. Crime victimization is not significant, suggesting
that personal reasons for joining neighborhood watches are not
motivating behavior. Fear of crime does not increase participation in these groups, suggesting that desired benefits (i.e. less
crime) do not influence behavior even when people believe there
is a problem. The police competence measure is also not significant; showing that institutional failure to provide adequate policing does not affect participation . Note that many (35%) in the
study think their police are incompetent. The other significant
T IIE J OU RNA L OF POLIT I CAL SC IENCE
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variables match their theoretical predictions . Age increases participation . Women have more involvement , and so do those in
rural areas. Note that the multiple imputation model and the
complete cases model show substantively similar results for
every variable and the constant.
PROBABILITIES OF NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PARTICIPATION

The results of the Clarify simulation displayed in Figure 2
show that when holding all other variables at their mean , those
FIGURE 2

.,,

SimulatedProbab1ht1es
of the Impactof Social RecreabonAcbvity
OnceWeek Almost Everyday

N

Never Once a Year

Once A Month

Levelof Social ActMty

Graph boxes represent the results of a logistic simulation
created by Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg , and King 2003) .
These simulations hold all control variables (victimization,
fear of crime, police competence, and socioeconomic variables) at their means and display the predicted value and
95% confidence intervals for the dependent variable
(neighborhood watch participation) for each level of the
causal variable (social activity).
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who are most actively involved with social networks are about
twice as likely to join their neighbors to fight crime as those who
are not socially active. In Japan, about 11% of those with no social activity are predicted to join, while about 19% of those with
the densest social networks join after controlling for Victim,
Fear, Police, and socioeconomic detem1inants of participation.
Those with almost every day social activities have a 95% confidence interval lowest bound (.14) that is above the highest bound
(.13) for those with no social activities. Thus, social recreational
activity increases the likelihood of community involvement as
measured by neighborhood watch participation. Thus, Putnam's
theory is verified by these results.

AGLS Regression Model
For the AGLS model, I use Education as an instrument. Many
studies show that education increases social networking (e.g.
Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995, Putnam 2001). Surprisingly, however, education does not influence joining crime watches, as
shown in Table 2. Thus , this is a counter-intuitive instrument, but
it still may control for bi-causality. Indeed, I find that Education
is significantly correlated with Social (b 0.08, s.e. 0.01 ), but not
Neighborhood watch (b 0.038, s.e. 0.027). Sensitivity analysis
revealed that taking Education out of the model had no discernable effect on Social. In the AGLS model, socialization strongly
positively influences the likelihood of joining a crime watch (b
0 .530, s.e. 0.409). The large standard error for Social is probably
due to imprecision in the instrument. Thus, we must be cautious
in interpreting this model, but the results suggest that there is no
bi-causal relationship . The AGLS results show similar effects for
all other variables. The robustness of the results suggests that
involvement does not influence the amount of socializing.
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TABLE 3
AGLS MODEL RESULTS FOR
PARTICIPATION I NEIGHBORHOOD WATCHES

Variab le
Social
Crime
Fear
Police
Female
Age
Urban
Employment
Marital
Constant
Number of cases
Pseudo R 2

x2

Coef.
0.530
0.042
-0.108
-0.123*
0.404*
0.083*
-0. 104!
00.149
0.078
-3.253*
2,211
0.03
47 .20!

S.E.
(0.409)
(0.092)
(0.059)
(0.057)
(0.179)
(0.038)
(0.024)
(0. I 93)
(0.172)
( 1.599)

Cells represent the average unstandardized coeflicients and standard e1Torsof a
AGLS model for the likelihood of joining a crime watch from of each imputed
data set. Er/11c111ion
is the instrument variable. *p < .05 t p < .0 I t p < .00 I

CONCLUS ION

I find that recreational activity encourages people to JOIO
crime watches in Japan. The results show that informal social
networking leads to participation in other areas. We cannot ignore the benefits to civil society from institution-exogenous informal social recreation. Critics of the inclusion of recreational
activities in civil society measures should not dismiss their influence on traditional political participation. The research approach
advocated by Gannett (2003), Edwards (2004) , Edwards and
Foley (2004) and Miller and Jackman (1998) ignores the impact
of social interaction on institutional involvement. Both formal
and informal interaction must be measured and considered to
detennine the full scope of civil society. These critics encourage
\'01..
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a focus only on the institution-endogenous determinants of civ il
society. Ignoring real-world complications in a quest for clarity
only further confuses our understanding of the multifaceted relationships we are studying. Additionally , the results reported here
suggest that although motivating involvement may be crucial to
stopping crime , incentive or specialized interest programs will
not motivate joiners. Increa sing the density of social connecte dness is where reformers should focus their energies . The results
show that informal networks increase communal participation to
reduce crime , suggesting other types of communal involve ment
will be influenced in a similar relationship.
Some caution, however, is needed in interpreting these results. The ability to examine this test is limited to the validity of
the survey data , question wording, and methodology (Zaller
1992). This is particularly true when only examining one survey
as I did here . In addition, there are no questions of social psy chology in the !CVS data , so possible determinants such as trust,
tolerance , and efficacy cannot be included in the model. Finally,
the inability to find a more precise instrument variable leaves
open the question of bi-causality . Despite these limitations, the
research provides some evidence of the positive impact of social
recreation on civic life.
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